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IFIMW  »«*^»  • 

fl|  CALIFORNIA,  SAN  DlfcGU 
CALIFORNIA 


GEORGE  WASHINGTON 


AS  COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 


JHfc  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARY 
W^>,>  Hf  OF  CALIFORNIA,  SAN  Ol£» 
50LIA  CALIFORNIA 

JAMES  HOSMER  PENNIMAN,  LITT.D. 


LIBRARY 

UNlVERSmr  OF 
CAUFOft** 

.  BAN  DIEGO 


GEORGE  WASHINGTON 

AS  COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 


BY 

JAMES  HOSMER  PENNIMAN,  LITT.  D. 


COPYRIGHT 

JAMES  H.  PENNIMAN 
1917 


GEORGE  WASHINGTON 

AS  COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF 

To  no  other  human  cause  is  the  success  of  the 
Americans  struggling  with  the  Mother  Country  in 
the  War  of  the  Revolution  due  so  largely  as  to  the 
tenacity  of  purpose  of  the  extraordinary  man  who 
led  their  forces,  added  to  the  remarkable  fact  that 
he  who  assumed  command  under  the  Old  Elm  at 
Cambridge  in  1775,  remained  Commander-in-Chief 
throughout  the  long  war,  and  in  1781  forced  Corn- 
wallis  to  surrender  at  Yprktown. 

Though  Washington  exposed  himself  with  dash- 
ing courage,  there  is  no  record  of  his  having  been 
wounded.  Though  seriously  ill  a  number  of  times 
before  and  after  the  war,  he  was  always  in  full 
possession  of  his  faculties  during  the  Revolution. 
When  we  recall  that  the  disastrous  surprise  at 
Brooklyn  has  been  attributed  to  the  sickness  of 
General  Greene,  we  are  able  to  form  an  idea  of  what 
a  calamity  it  would  have  been  if  through  wounds  or 
disease  the  watchful  eye  of  the  Commander-in-Chief 
had  grown  dim  and  that  vigorous  mind  had  relaxed 
its  anxious  thought. 

The  occupation  of  cities  by  the  British  was 
always  of  minor  importance;  the  independence  of 
America  depended  on  her  ability  to  keep  an  army  in 
the  field.  Through  Washington's  efforts  for  eight 
years,  an  army  was  always  ready  and  he  was  always 
at  his  post.  During  the  war  he  left  the  army  on 
few  occasions,  and  then  only  when  public  business 
required  his  presence  elsewhere.  Washington  was 
always  the  principal  character  on  the  stage  of  the 


Revolutionary  War,  the  pivot  around  which  every- 
thing else  revolved.  He  had  to  contend  with  untold 
difficulties,  with  poverty,  with  cold,  with  hunger, 
with  shiftlessness,  with  envy,  with  treachery,  with 
hostile  criticism,  with  jealousy,  and  with  stupidity. 
Early  in  the  war  he  wrote:  "I  know  the  unhappy 
predicament  I  stand  in ;  I  know  that  much  is  expected 
of  me;  I  know  that  without  men,  without  arms, 
without  ammunition,  without  anything  fit  for  the 
accommodation  of  a  soldier,  little  is  to  be  done; 
and,  what  is  mortifying,  I  know  that  I  cannot  stand 
justified  to  the  world  without  exposing  my  own 
weakness,  and  injuring  the  cause,  which  I  am 
determined  not  to  do.  ...  My  own  situation  is 
so  irksome  to  me  at  times,  that,  if  I  did  not  consult 
the  public  good  more  than  my  own  tranquillity,  I 
should,  long  ere  this,  have  put  everything  on  the  cast 
of  a  die." 

His  success  was  due  to  constant  striving  against 
adverse  circumstances;  he  had  remarkable  fore- 
thought, but  he  anticipated  difficulties  only  to  over- 
come them.  Misfortunes  and  accidents  retarded  but 
did  not  arrest  his  progress.  He  was  always  prepared 
for  reverses,  and  had  a  way  of  retreat  ready.  When 
his  army  was  defeated  it  was  not  routed,  and  was 
able  to  attack  again  as  soon  as  an  opportunity  pre- 
sented itself.  Never  unduly  elated  by  success,  he  was 
never  nobler  than  in  disaster,  and  at  no  time  more 
dangerous  than  when  he  seemed  defeated;  for  no 
man  was  more  ready  than  he  to  profit  by  the 
mistakes  of  his  opponent,  and  no  man  was  swifter  to 
retrieve  his  own  errors.  As  was  remarked  of 
Napoleon,  "To  say  that  he  committed  faults  is  only 
to  say  that  he  made  war,"  but  Washington's  military 
misfortunes  were  usually  of  such  a  character  as  to 
add  to  his  renown.  His  bringing  a  beaten  army  of 


raw  troops  to  fight  bravely  a  few  days  after  defeat, 
as  he  did  at  Germantown,  aroused  the  admiration  of 
the  military  experts  of  Europe;  and  no  commander 
ever  gave  a  grander  exhibition  of  personal  power 
than  did  Washington  when  he  rallied  the  fleeing 
forces  of  Charles  Lee  and  sent  them  back  to  the  fight 
at  Monmouth.  No  matter  how  few  in  numbers,  an 
army  commanded  by  Washington  was  always  formi- 
dable, for  he  knew  how  to  adapt  his  undertakings  to 
the  means  at  his  disposal.  He  took  advantage  of 
every  opportunity,  and  when  an  opportunity  did  not 
present  itself,  he  created  one.  His  force  was  not 
only  usually  weaker  numerically  than  that  of  the 
enemy,  but  also  inferior  in  discipline  and  military 
training;  but  so  great  was  his  personal  influence, 
and  such  his  skill  in  seizing  on  natural  advan- 
tages of  position,  in  reinforcing  them  by  all  the 
known  devices  of  military  art  and  by  others  hitherto 
unknown  which  he  originated,  that  he  outmaneuvred 
the  British  generals  and  often  forced  them  to  keep  on 
the  defensive  or  to  withdraw.  His  success  was 
largely  due  to  his  wonderful  skill  in  putting  his  force 
exactly  where  it  would  do  most  good.  His  experi- 
ence as  a  surveyor  gave  him  a  knowledge  of  topog- 
raphy and  an  ability  to  select  the  strongest  position, 
that  was  superior  to  that  of  any  other  man  in 
either  army. 

He  did  not  trust  to  others  the  important  work 
of  reconnoitering,  if  it  was  possible  to  do  it  himself. 
Money  spent  on  reconnoitering  excursions  forms  one 
of  the  most  frequent  items  in  his  accounts ;  and  roads, 
rivers,  fords,  mountain  passes,  and  elevated  positions 
were  always  studied  by  him  with  the  utmost  care. 
That  communication  between  the  Northern  and 
Southern  States,  which  was  essential  to  the  suc- 
cess of  the  American  cause,  was  always  kept  open 


throughout  the  war,  was  due  to  his  study  of  the 
country  around  the  Hudson,  and  to  his  occupation  of 
West  Point  and  the  Highland  passes  which  controlled 
that  river.  More  than  any  battles  that  he  fought,  his 
selection  of  positions  like  West  Point,  Morristown 
and  Valley  Forge,  kept  the  British  in  constant 
danger;  for  in  these  places  he  could  not  be  attacked 
to  advantage;  he  could  easily  retreat  if  necessary; 
such  supplies  as  the  country  afforded  were  within  his 
reach ;  he  could  harass  British  foraging  parties  and 
prevent  intercourse  with  the  surrounding  country; 
and  if  the  enemy  moved  in  force,  he  was  ready  to  hang 
on  his  flanks  and  cut  his  communications.  He  kept 
informed  of  the  intentions  of  the  British,  for  his 
spies  were  continually  coming  and  going.  Washing- 
ton's perception  of  the  enemy's  plans  and  his 
ingenuity  in  using  the  means  at  his  disposal  for 
overthrowing  them  were  the  result  of  the  power 
which  he  constantly  exercised  of  putting  himself  in 
the  place  of  the  opposing  general,  and  of  divining  his 
plans  by  imagining  what  he  himself  would  do  in  sim- 
ilar circumstances;  so  that  he  knew  what  General 
Howe  ought  to  do  better  than  Howe  himself,  and  was 
at  times  puzzled  because  Howe  blindly  refused  to  do 
what  was  obviously  to  his  great  advantage;  as,  for 
example,  when  Howe  went  to  Philadelphia  instead  of 
up  the  Hudson  to  the  relief  of  Burgoyne.  This 
was  the  greatest  mistake  that  the  British  made 
during  the  war. 

Most  of  the  campaigns  of  the  Revolution  were 
planned  by  Washington,  even  those  in  which  he  did 
not  take  part.  His  papers  describe  many  projects 
which,  though  carefully  devised,  came  to  nothing 
through  the  incompetence  of  subordinates,  lack  of 
means  to  provide  the  ordinary  requisites  of  military 
operations,  or  through  other  circumstances  which 

5 


could  not  be  anticipated  or  prevented.  His  actions 
were  based  upon  a  broad  foundation  of  common 
sense,  but,  as  Dr.  Weir  Mitchell  said,  "If  common 
sense  explains  his  life,  it  was  common  sense  lifted  to 
the  level  of  genius."  Edward  Everett  thought  that 
the  most  striking  trait  of  Washington's  character 
was  judicial  moderation.  He  did  not  make  up  his 
mind  hastily.  As  soon  as  he  awoke  in  the  morning, 
he  mapped  out  the  business  of  the  day;  and  he  fre- 
quently retired  to  some  quiet  place  for  periods  of 
prayer  and  meditation.  He  gave  due  weight  to  the 
opinions  of  others,  but  had  the  force  of  character  to 
act  on  his  own  responsibility,  and  when  he  had  done 
his  utmost,  he  was  content  to  abide  by  the  decision  of 
Providence.  Avoiding  side  issues,  his  mind  went 
straight  to  the  point.  As  soon  as  he  was  sure  of  his 
opponent's  intentions,  his  energies  were  concentrated 
on  the  vital  spot  to  defeat  them.  When  his  plan  was 
formed,  he  was  swift  to  carry  it  out.  One  of  his  prin- 
ciples was,  when  you  cannot  win,  make  it  as  hard  for 
the  enemy  as  you  can.  He  fought  every  inch  of  the 
way  where  it  was  possible,  but  no  one  could  withdraw 
quicker  than  he  when  circumstances  demanded. 
Nothing  but  his  promptness  in  this  respect  saved 
the  army  at  Brooklyn  and  at  Trenton.  On  each  of 
these  occasions  -the  British  retired  to  rest  with  the 
expectation  of  annihilating  the  Americans  in  the 
morning,  but  during  the  night  Washington  had  van- 
ished with  his  army.  Though  the  British  employed 
many  devices  to  draw  him  into  false  movements,  he 
refused  to  be  entrapped  by  them;  and  on  the  other 
hand,  he  was  ever  ready  to  take  advantage  of 
mistakes  on  their  part.  Too  wary  to  allow  himself 
to  be  surprised,  he  understood  the  power  of  surprise 
to  help  a  weaker  force,  and  made  use  of  it  at  Trenton, 
Germantown  and  Stony  Point.  No  one  appreciated 


better  than  Washington  the  axiom  that  in  military 
operations  time  is  everything,  for  time  was  his  most 
powerful  ally.  While  time  was  passing,  the  British 
were  spending  vast  sums  on  their  army  and  fleet; 
public  opinion  in  opposition  to  the  will  of  George  III 
was  gaining  strength  in  England;  the  French  were 
being  won  over;  raw  recruits  were  being  disciplined 
into  an  army;  and  the  thirteen  colonies  were  being 
welded  into  a  nation.  From  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  well-trained  armies  of  professional  soldiers  were 
contending  with  the  American  people;  and  though 
the  Americans  were  brave,  and  accustomed  to  the 
use  of  arms  from  youth,  they  learned  by  sad  experi- 
ence at  Brooklyn  and  New  York  that  bodies  of  men 
do  not  make  an  army  unless  they  are  properly 
disciplined.  No  one  realized  this  more  fully  than 
Washington,  and  he  was  constantly  writing  moni- 
tions like  these :  "Discipline  is  the  soul  of  an  army — 
it  makes  small  numbers  formidable — procures  suc- 
cess to  the  weak,  and  esteem  to  all."  "Strict  order  is 
the  life  of  military  discipline."  "To  make  men  well 
acquainted  with  the  duties  of  a  soldier  requires  time ; 
to  bring  them  under  proper  discipline  and  subordina- 
tion not  only  requires  time,  but  is  a  work  of  great 
difficulty;  and  in  this  army,  where  there  is  so  little 
distinction  between  officers  and  soldiers,  requires  an 
uncommon  degree  of  attention.  To  expect,  then,  the 
same  service  from  raw  and  undisciplined  recruits  as 
from  veteran  soldiers,  is  to  expect  what  never  did, 
and  perhaps  never  will  happen." 

To  Colonel  William  Woodford,  he  wrote,  Novem- 
ber 10,  1775,  "Be  strict  in  your  discipline;  that  is, 
require  nothing  unreasonable  of  your  officers  and 
men,  but  see  that  whatever  is  required  be  punctually 
complied  with.  Reward  and  punish  every  man 
according  to  his  merit,  without  partiality  or  preju- 


dice;  hear  his  complaints;  if  well  founded,  redress 
them;  if  otherwise,  discourage  them,  in  order  to 
prevent  frivolous  ones.  Discourage  vice  in  every 
shape,  and  impress  upon  the  mind  of  every  man, 
from  the  first  to  the  lowest,  the  importance  of  the 
cause,  and  what  it  is  they  are  contending  for.  For- 
ever keep  in  view  the  necessity  of  guarding  against 
surprises.  In  all  your  marches,  at  times,  at  least, 
even  when  there  is  no  possible  danger,  move  with 
front,  rear  and  flank  guards,  that  they  may  be 
familiarized  to  the  use;  and  be  regular  in  your 
encampments,  appointing  necessary  guards  for  the 
security  of  your  camp.  In  short,  whether  you  expect 
an  enemy  or  not,  this  should  be  practiced ;  otherwise 
your  attempts  will  be  confused  and  awkward  when 
necessary.  Be  plain  and  precise  in  your  orders,  and 
keep  copies  of  them  to  refer  to,  that  no  mistakes  may 
happen.  Be  easy  and  condescending  in  your  deport- 
ment to  your  officers,  but  not  too  familiar,  lest  you 
subject  yourself  to  a  want  of  that  respect,  which  is 
necessary  to  support  a  proper  command." 

Under  Washington,  the  character  of  the  army 
was  constantly  improving.  He  patiently  reconciled 
the  prejudices  and  jealousies  of  the  men  of  the  vari- 
ous colonies,  and  was  always  trying  to  organize  an 
American  army.  When  in  camp,  all  general  and  field 
officers  dined  with  him  every  day  at  three;  so  the 
General  kept  in  touch  with  his  men,  and  they  became 
comrades.  He  began  this  custom  as  soon  as  he  took 
command  at  Cambridge.  Wherever  it  was  possible, 
he  personally  saw  the  officers  whom  he  entrusted 
with  important  work.  His  success  was  largely  due 
to  his  shrewdness  in  dealing  with  men  and  to  his 
ability  to  select  the  right  man  for  the  place.  He  knew 
mankind  from  lifelong  and  active  experience,  in  the 
House  of  Burgesses  of  Virginia,  in  Congress,  in  the 

8 


Army,  on  the  farm,  and  in  the  forest!  He  under- 
stood the  motives  and  dispositions  of  such  various 
races  as  Americans,  British,  French,  Indians  and 
negroes.  The  range  of  his  experience  extended  over 
the  whole  gamut  of  human  nature,  from  the  selfish- 
ness of  an  Arnold  or  a  Gates  to  the  lofty  patriotism  of 
a  Lafayette  or  a  Greene,  whose  highest  ambition  was 
to  act  at  all  times  as  Washington  would  have  done. 

Experience  had  taught  him  not  to  expect  too 
much,  and  he  wrote  Philip  Schuyler :  "We  must  bear 
up — and  make  the  best  of  mankind  as  they  are,  since 
we  cannot  have  them  as  we  wish ;"  a  sentiment  which 
reminds  us  of  the  epigrams  of  Montaigne.  The  con- 
fidence which  existed  between  Washington  and  men 
like  Greene,  Knox  and  Lafayette,  was  a  charming 
feature  of  the  war.  It  is  said  that  even  thirty  years 
after,  Washington's  officers  could  not  speak  of  his 
farewell  without  tears.  The  devotion  of  his  friends 
and  neighbors  was  conspicuous  throughout  his  career. 
He  had  the  confidence  of  men  of  influence,  and  he 
utilized  their  attachment  to  him  for  the  good  of  his 
country  as  no  other  man  in  America  could  have  done. 
Knox  wrote  him :  "I  know  that  the  people  of  America 
look  up  to  you  as  their  Father,  and  into  your  hands 
they  trust  their  all,  confident  of  every  exertion  on 
your  part  for  their  security  and  happiness ;  and  I  do 
not  believe  there  is  any  man  on  earth  for  whose  wel- 
fare there  are  more  solicitations  at  the  Court  of 
Heaven  than  for  yours." 

Washington  received  cruel  wounds  from  some 
who  pretended  to  be  his  friends,  who  found  it  the 
easier  to  attack  him  because  he  could  not  reply  to 
their  charges  of  inefficiency  without  informing  the 
enemy  of  his  lack  of  powder  and  of  every  other  mil- 
itary necessity.  He  had  a  deep  aversion  to  contro- 
versies, and  especially  tried  to  avoid  feuds  that  might 

9 


injure  the  American  cause.  He  never  took  up  a 
quarrel  unless  it  was  forced  upon  him;  but  when  it 
was  necessary,  he  acted  with  decision,  and  showed 
people  with  such  different  kinds  of  presumption  as 
Lord  Howe,  Gates  and  Conway  that  it  was  not  safe 
to  take  liberties  with  him.  In  spite  of  experiences 
with  traitors  like  Charles  Lee  and  Arnold,  he  never 
lost  faith  in  humanity,  and  he  loved  to  believe  that 
other  men  were  as  noble-natured  as  himself.  His 
reason  controlled  his  passions,  so  that  even  his  ene- 
mies respected  him.  His  acts  and  words  were  those 
of  a  gentleman,  and  the  grand  manner  which  he 
learned  in  youth  from  Lord  Fairfax  he  always 
retained.  When  necessary  he  could  be  severe,  but  his 
own  inclination  was  always  toward  mercy.  He  never 
permitted  his  personal  feelings  to  stand  in  the 
way  of  his  duty,  and  his  example  was  the  most 
powerful  influence. 

Washington  was  a  careful  observer  and  listener. 
He  was  everywhere,  his  eye  saw  everything,  and 
there  was  a  sternness  in  that  eye  that  no  man  whose 
work  was  not  well  done  would  willingly  face.  Though 
he  saw  all,  he  said  little,  but,  when  circumstances 
warranted  it,  he  could  speak  such  burning  words  that 
Henry  Lee  said  he  was  like  the  torrent  of  Niagara. 
Yet  he  did  not  bear  malice,  and  he  wrote  that  he 
never  said  anything  of  a  man  that  he  would  not  say 
to  him.  No  greater  evidence  of  his  wonderful  per- 
sonality could  be  given  than  the  way  in  which  he 
immediately  won  the  respect,  admiration  and  affec- 
tion of  accomplished  Frenchmen,  when  the  whirligig 
of  time  had  made  those  against  whom  he  contended 
in  his  youth  the  allies  of  his  later  years.  Rocham- 
beau  said  that  he  never  knew  what  true  glory  was, 
nor  a  truly  great  man,  till  he  met  Washington. 

10 


It  is  hardly  possible  to  give  a  better  picture  of 
Washington  during  the  Revolution  than  those  few 
words  of  Mr.  Owen  Wister,  which  describe  him  as 
"hurrying  somewhere  on  a  horse  with  ragged  soldiers 
behind  him."  One  might  preach  a  sermon  on  Wash- 
ington with  these  words  as  a  text,  for  every  one  is 
big  with  meaning.  Hurrying  indicates  strength, 
energy  and  zeal.  Somewhere,  not  anywhere,  to  a 
place  carefully  chosen  where  he  could  do  the  utmost 
for  his  country.  On  a  horse — Jefferson  said  he  was 
the  best  horseman  of  his  age,  and  history  and  art 
alike  record  no  nobler  figure  than  Washington  on 
horseback.  Ragged — his  men  were  ragged  because 
they  were  giving  up  all  to  fight  for  the  country  which 
did  not  pay  them  even  the  pittance  it  had  agreed  to. 
The  Americans  were  the  most  hard-working,  honest 
and  thrifty  people  on  earth,  and  were  never  ragged 
except  when  serving  in  the  Continental  Army. 
Behind  him — they  were  backing  him  up  to  the  extent 
of  their  ability,  because  he  had  won  their  hearts. 
For,  however  he  might  be  criticized  by  those  who 
planned  campaigns  by  the  warm  fireside,  he  had  the 
confidence  of  the  freezing,  starving  heroes  around 
him.  It  was  serious  business  to  serve  under  Wash- 
ington. He  was  a  leader  who  could  make  men  do 
things.  As  soon  as  recruits  saw  him,  they  felt  that 
here  was  a  man  on  whom  they  could  rely  to  the  last 
extremity,  and  it  was  this  that  sustained  his  men  at 
Brooklyn  and  Trenton.  No  one  but  him  could  have 
kept  the  army  together  during  those  weary  months 
at  Valley  Forge  and  Morristown.  As  Archibald 
Forbes  said  of  Skobelev :  "He  radiated  from  him  the 
mysterious  irresistible  magnetism  that  inspired  men 
to  follow  him,  to  use  the  rough  soldier-phrase, 
'through  hell  and  out  at  the  farther  side.' "  Like 
Napoleon,  he  kept  in  touch  with  his  men,  and 

ll 


explained  the  situation  to  them  and  appealed  to  their 
patriotism  when  great  efforts  were  needed.  Patriot- 
ism may  generally  be  said  to  diminish  in  propor- 
tion to  the  distance  from  home,  perhaps  even  as  the 
square  of  the  distance;  but  the  men  who  followed 
Washington  thought  that  it  was  their  duty  to  obey 
wherever  they  were,  in  hunger  and  cold  and  rags, 
and  to  die  obeying.  His  courage  was  the  admiration 
of  his  men :  the  only  thing  they  had  against  him  was 
the  fearless  way  in  which  he  exposed  himself;  but, 
though  he  risked  his  own  life,  he  was  careful  not  to 
endanger  theirs  unless  it  was  necessary,  and  his 
anguish  at  the  useless  exposure  of  his  troops  at 
Brooklyn  is  recorded  by  eye-witnesses. 

In  times  of  danger  his  mind  worked  more 
quickly,  and  a  fellow  Virginian  described  him  as 
being  as  cool  in  action  as  a  bishop  at  his  prayers. 
Jefferson  said  that  he  was  "incapable  of  fear,  meet- 
ing personal  dangers  with  the  calmest  unconcern." 
Washington  not  only  had  courage  under  fire,  but  he 
had  what  is  far  more  unusual  and  what  was  much 
more  valuable  to  the  cause  for  which  he  was  con- 
tending— he  had  the  fortitude  to  endure  suffering, 
suspicion,  want,  and  physical  and  mental  weariness, 
without  losing  faith  in  the  cause  and  in  mankind. 
The  one  thing  that  made  him  lose  his  self-control  was 
cowardice  on  the  part  of  his  men ;  and  on  the  other 
hand,  his  admiration  of  bravery  was  such  that, 
although  usually  a  remarkable  judge  of  character,  he 
overlooked  Benedict  Arnold's  failings,  and  appointed 
him  to  the  most  responsible  position  at  his  disposal. 
This  was  perhaps  the  greatest  mistake  that  Wash- 
ington made  during  the  war,  and  an  explanation  of 
it  may  be  found  in  the  possibility  that,  as  sometimes 
happens,  Arnold's  severe  wounds  had  caused  a 
deterioration  in  his  moral  fibre.  It  is  interesting  to 

12 


note  that  the  difference  between  the  enduring  forti- 
tude of  a  Washington  and  the  rash  gallantry  of  a 
Benedict  Arnold  was  observed  centuries  ago;  for 
Plato  says  that  a  mind  prepared  to  meet  danger,  if 
impelled  by  its  own  eagerness  rather  than  by  the 
public  good,  deserves  more  the  name  of  audacity  than 
of  courage.  Though  as  devoted  to  the  occupations 
of  peace  as  any  man  in  America,  when  aroused 
Washington  had  a  flaming  ardor  of  combativity 
which  illuminated  the  darkest  circumstances ;  so  that 
it  was  said  that  "Hope  shone  in  him  like  a  pillar  of 
fire,  when  it  had  gone  out  in  all  other  men."  No  one 
understood  better  than  he  the  axiom  that  it  is  not 
the  actual  loss  of  men  in  battle  which  is  disastrous 
so  much  as  the  resulting  discouragement  which 
deprives  the  remaining  forces  of  their  power  to 
continue  the  struggle.  It  was  always  necessary  for 
him  to  act  in  such  a  manner  as  to  keep  up  the  spirits 
of  the  army  and  of  the  nation.  This  was  his  most 
important  work.  Public  opinion  at  times  forced  him 
to  attempt  what  was  not  in  accordance  with  his  own 
views  or  with  military  policy.  He  fought  the  Battle 
of  the  Brandywine,  for  instance,  in  the  vain  attempt 
to  keep  the  superior  force  of  Lord  Howe  from  the 
occupation  of  Philadelphia,  which  proved  to  be  of 
little  use  to  them.  The  short  periods  of  enlistment 
caused  it  to  be  said  that  he  was  obliged  to  carry  on 
war,  "not  according  to  military  opportunities,  but 
according  to  the  calendar."  And  he  wrote,  "it  is 
as  easy  to  stop  a  torrent  as  the  soldiers  when  their 
time  is  up." 

The  might  of  Washington's  sword  depended,  to 
a  much  greater  extent  than  is  generally  realized, 
upon  the  power  of  his  pen.  Throughout  the  Revolu- 
tion he  was  busy  writing  instructions  for  his  men, 
letters  to  Congress,  to  Lord  Howe,  to  Brother 

13 


Jonathan  Trumbull,  to  people  of  influence  every- 
where. He  was  the  most  productive  of  American 
writers;  the  collection  of  his  manuscripts  in  the 
Library  of  Congress  is  known  to  be  the  largest  of 
any  one  man  in  the  world.  In  the  calendar  of  his 
letters  to  the  Continental  Congress  from  1775  to  1783 
are  about  two  thousand  letters,  or  nearly  one  a  day, 
and  he  wrote  about  seven  thousand  other  military 
letters  in  the  same  period.  He  also  wrote  at  this 
time  numerous  letters  to  his  wife,  only  one  of  which 
has  been  preserved,  and  a  very  long  weekly  letter  to 
Lund  Washington  about  the  management  of  affairs 
at  Mount  Vernon.  In  addition  to  these,  he  wrote 
many  other  letters  of  business,  ceremony  or  friend- 
ship during  the  war.  The  letters  written  by  his 
secretaries  were  revised  by  him,  and  elaborate  drafts 
of  official  letters,  entirely  in  the  handwriting  of 
Washington,  were  often  prepared  in  moments 
snatched  from  needed  repose,  and  sometimes  in  the 
midst  of  actual  danger.  Yet  his  high-toned  manner 
never  forsook  him,  and  he  always  wrote  like  a 
gentleman.  No  military  man  and  few  men  of  letters 
have  been  able  to  use  the  English  language  more 
skillfully,  and  his  style  was  singuarly  concise,  accu- 
rate and  direct.  Guizot  said  that  Washington  was 
endowed  to  an  extraordinary  degree  with  the  power 
of  influencing  men  by  "honorable  sentiments  and  by 
truth";  but  though  much  was  due  to  his  persuasive 
charm,  his  words  also  commanded  respect,  because 
it  was  felt  that,  to  apply  to  him  an  expression  of 
Alphonse  Daudet,  he  could  make  powder  talk  as  well 
as  ink.  The  influence  of  Washington's  letters  in 
forming  public  opinion  throughout  the  war  was 
enormous,  for  such  was  the  confidence  in  his  relia- 
bility and  integrity  that  when,  for  instance,  Governor 
Jonathan  Trumbull  received  a  letter  from  General 

14 


Washington  stating  that  supplies  were  needed,  every 
nerve  was  strained  to  meet  the  demand. 

Washington's  tact,  patience  and  wisdom  were 
nowhere  more  conspicuous  than  in  his  letters  to 
Congress;  nominally  its  servant,  he  often  inspired 
and  directed  it.  No  other  man  possessed  its  confidence 
to  such  a  degree;  so  that,  though  Congress  was 
always  jealous  of  military  dominion,  when  there  was 
the  greatest  danger  it  did  not  hesitate  to  invest  him 
with  dictatorial  power.  He  was  especially  busy 
during  the  winters  in  urging  Congress  and  the 
governors  of  the  States  to  take  the  necessary  steps 
for  raising  and  subsisting  a  suitable  army,  in  caring 
for  the  little  band  of  ragged  patriots  hutted  around 
him,  and  in  preparing  for  the  summer  campaign. 
These  were  tasks  of  the  utmost  difficulty,  for  the 
system  of  government  of  the  colonies  was  dis- 
arranged by  the  outbreak  of  the  war,  and  such 
authority  as  existed  was  mostly  in  the  hands  of 
Committees  of  Safety,  with  no  legal  powers,  whose 
duties  were  vaguely  defined.  Yet  so  great  was  the 
intelligence  and  patriotism  of  the  people,  that  there 
was  little  crime  or  disorder. 

Washington's  ability  to  select  important  points 
from  masses  of  detail,  to  winnow  the  true  from  the 
false,  and  to  size  up  a  situation,  was  little  short  of 
marvellous.  He  always  had  the  latest  and  fullest 
intelligence,  and  it  is  not  easy  to  realize  the  difficulty 
of  obtaining  reliable  information  during  the  Revolu- 
tion. Communication  was  slow,  and  dangerous; 
opportunities  for  observation  were  restricted ;  news- 
papers were  issued  irregularly,  and  had  only  a  lim- 
ited circulation.  Washington  took  personal  charge 
of  the  Secret  Service,  and  had  gold  for  this  depart- 
ment when  gold  was  a  curiosity  and  there  was  noth- 
ing but  paper  money  for  all  other  purposes.  General 

15 


Greene  voiced  the  opinion  of  his  chief  when  he  wrote : 
"Spies  are  the  eyes  of  an  army,  and  without  them,  a 
general  is  always  groping  in  the  dark."  Many  of 
Washington's  spies  were  known  to  him  alone;  they 
used  invisible  ink,  and  important  papers  were  often 
concealed  in  the  pommel  of  a  saddle,  or  in  buttons. 
The  success  at  Trenton  is  attributable  to  two  causes : 
to  the  accurate  information  which  Washington's  spies 
brought  him  of  the  numbers,  disposition  and  condi- 
tion of  the  Hessians;  and  to  Washington's  fore- 
thought in  taking  the  unusual  number  of  eighteen 
cannon  with  his  force  of  only  twenty-four  hundred 
men.  That  stormy  morning,  muskets  were  mostly 
wet  and  useless,  but  cannon  could  be  employed  in  any 
weather,  and  six  guns  pointed  at  two  regiments  of 
Hessians  at  less  than  three  hundred  yards,  decided 
the  contest  before  it  began. 

Washington  constantly  felt  his  lack  of  theoretical 
training  in  military  affairs,  and  late  in  life  he  wrote : 
"A  thorough  examination  of  the  subject  will  evince 
that  the  art  of  war  is  extensive  and  complicated ;  that 
it  demands  much  previous  study;  and  that  the  pos- 
session of  it  in  its  most  important  and  perfect  state 
is  always  of  great  moment  to  the  security  of  a 
nation." 

As  a  young  man,  he  read  a  translation  of 
Caesar's  Commentaries,  and  must  have  studied  other 
military  works ;  for,  in  1754,  William  Fairfax  wrote 
him  these  memorable  words:  "In  the  Duke  of 
Marlborough's  campaign  you'll  observe  many  wise 
retreats  performed  that  were  not  called  flights" — 
words  which  were,  no  doubt,  in  Washington's  mind 
as  he  retired  in  that  masterly  way  through  New 
Jersey  late  in  1776.  Marlborough  learned  the  art  of 
war  from  Turenne,  Conde,  and  Vauban,  the  great 
masters  of  his  time,  under  whom  he  served  for  five 

16 


years.  With  the  single  exception  of  General  Brad- 
dock,  who,  it  may  be  assumed,  learned  more  from 
Washington  than  Washington  did  from  him,  he  never 
served  under  any  one  who  could  give  him  any  military 
instruction  whatever.  The  principal  advantage  he 
derived  from  the  campaign  with  Braddock  was 
the  opportunity  for  observation  of  the  British 
regular,  collectively  and  individually,  observation 
which  doubtless  formed  the  basis  of  much  of  his 
subsequent  success.  He  was  always  a  thorough, 
hard-working  student  of  subjects  like  Agriculture, 
Military  Affairs,  and  Government,  which  it  was  his 
business  to  know;  and  he  spared  no  trouble  or 
expense  to  obtain  the  best  books,  and  made  careful 
abstracts  of  them,  some  of  which  may  be  seen  among 
his  manuscripts  in  the  Library  of  Congress.  In  1775 
he  recommended  one  of  his  officers  to  familiarize 
himself  with  Eland's  Essay  on  the  Art  of  War, 
Instructions  for  Officers,  The  Partisan,  Young,  and 
others.  Among  the  military  books  in  his  library  were 
Otway's  Art  of  War,  The  Doctrine  of  Projectiles, 
Daveis's  Cavalry,  Simm's  Military  Course,  A  Work 
on  Manoeuvres,  Stevenson's  Military  Instructions  for 
Officers  Detached  in  the  Field,  Count  Saxe's  Plan  for 
New  Modeling  the  French  Army,  A  New  System  of 
Military  Discipline,  Prussian  Evolutions  in  Actual 
Engagements,  Code  of  Military  Standing  Resolutions, 
Claviac's  Field  Engineer,  Miiller  on  Fortification, 
Anderson's  Essays  on  Field  Artillery,  A  System  of 
Camp  Discipline,  Vallancey  on  Fortification,  Picker- 
ing's Militia,  Steuben's  Regulations  for  the  Order 
and  Discipline  of  the  Troops  of  the  United  States, 
Traite  de  Cavalerie,  Webb's  Treatise  on  the  Ap- 
pointments of  the  Army,  De  Jeney's  The  Partisan, 
or  the  Art  of  Making  War  in  Detachment,  The 
Military  Guide,  The  Duties  of  Soldiers  in  General. 

17 


Few  men  have  ever  learned  the  trade  of  the 
soldier  in  a  harder  school  of  practical  experience,  and 
no  man  ever  paid  a  higher  price  in  work  and  dis- 
comfort for  the  honors  that  he  gained.  No  better 
training  could  have  been  provided  for  the  command 
of  the  Revolutionary  Armies  than  Washington's 
apprenticeship  in  the  Virginia  forces  from  1751  to 
1758.  He  learned  then  how  to  deal  with  untrained 
soldiers,  with  disciplined  British  troops,  with  French, 
Indians,  colonists,  and  with  a  Colonial  Legislature; 
and  he  then  acquired  the  habit  of  accomplishing 
results  with  feeble  resources,  which  remained  with 
him  through  life.  In  spite  of  his  lack  of  military 
training  on  a  large  scale,  Washington  was  far  better 
equipped  than  the  British  generals  for  the  conduct  of 
the  war  in  America;  for  he  understood  the  country 
and  the  people  as  did  no  other  man,  with  the  possible 
exception  of  Franklin.  He  had  in  an  unusual  degree  a 
combination  of  opposite  qualities  of  the  utmost  value 
to  a  commander.  Because  of  his  broad  common  sense, 
severity  was  tempered  by  clemency,  audacity  by 
caution ;  and  no  other  general  has  ever  been  able  to 
take  a  more  comprehensive  view  of  the  whole  field  of 
affairs  and  at  the  same  time  to  devote  such  concen- 
trated attention  to  details. 

Much  of  the  routine  of  the  soldier's  trade  is  sim- 
ilar to  that  of  any  other  business,  so  that  the  careful 
work  which  he  performed  in  the  management  of  the 
large  estates  in  Virginia  was  an  excellent  prepara- 
tion for  the  task  of  providing  food,  clothes,  powder, 
guns,  transportation,  money  and  men  for  his  army; 
for  he  had  to  feed,  move  and  pay  it,  while  contending 
with  the  perfectly  appointed  forces  of  the  richest 
nation  in  the  world ;  and  he  did  all  these  things  under 
a  fire  of  criticism  at  home  that  was  far  more  difficult 
to  endure  than  that  of  the  enemies'  guns.  Nothing 

18 


with  regard  to  his  troops  was  too  minute  for  his 
attention. 

"While  at  the  head  of  the  army,"  says  Sparks, 
"the  names  and  rank  of  the  officers,  the  returns  of  the 
adjutants,  commissaries,  and  quartermasters,  were 
compressed  by  him  into  systematic  tables,  so  con- 
trived as  to  fix  strongly  in  his  mind  the  most  essential 
parts,  without  being  encumbered  with  details.  When 
the  army  was  to  march,  or  perform  any  movements 
requiring  combination  and  concert,  a  scheme  was 
first  delineated;  and  at  the  beginning  of  an  active 
campaign,  or  in  the  preparation  for  a  detached  enter- 
prise, the  line  of  battle  was  projected  and  sketched 
on  paper,  each  officer  being  assigned  to  his  post,  with 
the  names  of  the  regiment  and  strength  of  the  forces 
he  was  to  command."  Ever  the  best  fitted  for 
military  command,  Washington  was  always  the  last 
to  seek  it.  He  never  overestimated  himself,  and  was 
always  ready  to  recognize  his  faults  and  correct  them. 
He  said,  "I  do  not  think  vanity  is  a  trait  of  my  char- 
acter." He  rarely  talked  of  what  he  was  going  to  do, 
and  never  boasted  of  what  he  had  done.  He  was 
always  more  interested  in  the  present  and  future  than 
in  the  past.  He  cared  for  the  success  of  the  cause 
rather  than  for  his  own  glory,  and  did  not  hesitate 
to  send  his  best  troops  when  they  could  be  of  use  to 
other  generals — a  service  which  was  not  returned  at 
times  of  his  urgent  necessity ;  for  instance,  Washing- 
ton said  that  if,  after  the  surrender  of  Burgoyne, 
Gates  had  promptly  sent  back  Morgan's  riflemen  and 
the  other  troops  which  he  had  despatched  to  his  aid, 
the  forts  on  the  Delaware  could  have  been  held, 
Howe's  army  in  Philadelphia  starved  out,  and  the 
war  shortened  by  several  years.  Washington  sought 
nothing  for  himself,  and  declined  all  payment  for  his 
services  during  the  struggle  with  Great  Britain.  It 

19 


is  said  that  the  only  personal  request  he  ever  made 
of  the  Government  was  that  he  might  be  permitted 
to  retain  his  original  commission.  It  is  now  in  the 
Headquarters  at  Morristown. 

General  Washington's  military  talents  were  the 
development  of  unusual  natural  qualities  trained  by 
a  long  series  of  Divinely  guided  experiences.  The 
stripling  who  professed  himself  charmed  by  the 
whistling  of  bullets,  in  the  process  of  time  grew  into 
the  stern  yet  tender-hearted  warrior  who  at  Brooklyn 
was  in  agony  at  the  loss  of  his  men.  At  twenty-two, 
Washington  wrote  "my  inclinations  are  strongly  bent 
to  arms."  After  the  Revolution,  at  fifty-three,  he 
called  war  "this  plague  to  mankind,"  and  said  "my 
first  wish  is  to  see  it  banished  from  off  the  earth." 
Yet  it  was  always  his  opinion  that  "to  be  prepared 
for  war  is  the  most  effective  means  to  promote 
peace."  His  last  letter,  written  two  days  before  his 
death,  was  to  Alexander  Hamilton,  on  the  establish- 
ment of  a  military  academy,  which  he  described  as  an 
object  of  primary  importance  to  this  country. 


20 


A  A          001  422  592 


CENTRAL  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARY 

University  of  California,  San  Diego 

DATE  DUE 


j                 m/ 

- 

FEB  l  7  1989 

FEB  1  o  1363 

a  39 

UCSD  Libr. 

